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Abstract— Copyright protection is a major issue in distributing
digital content. On the other hand, improvements to usability
are sought by content users. In this paper, we propose a secure
traitor tracing scheme against key exposure (TTaKE) which contains
the properties of both a traitor tracing scheme and a forward
secure public key cryptosystem. Its structure fits current digital
broadcasting systems and it may be useful in preventing traitors
from making illegal decoders and in minimizing the damage from
accidental key exposure. It can improve usability through these
properties.
I. INTRODUCTION
Background: In recent years, the bandwidth available for
Internet access has become wider, personal computers have
become widespread, and high-density storage media has be-
come inexpensive. As a result, it has become much easier for
audio and video content in digital form to be copied and re-
distributed illegally.
Several methods of protecting copyrighted work from illegal
distribution have been developed. Content providers (CPs)
distribute decoders that contain secret keys and send en-
crypted content to users, who decode it with their secret keys.
Moreover, to deter users to use secret keys illegally, traitor
tracing methods (TTs) have been developed [2], [3], [4], [5],
[8], [9], [10]. When a pirate decoder (PD) is found, these
methods are used to check the secret keys in the PD and trace
traitors. Furthermore, various countermeasures against secret
key exposure have been developed to minimize its damage [1],
[6], [7]. They employ user’s secret key updating and limit its
valid period.
When a TT is used, the risk of secret key exposure must
be kept in mind, and a protocol that minimizes the damage
due to key exposure is necessary. What is needed is a secure
traitor tracing scheme against key exposure.
Application: When users receive content distribution service
at home, they store their secret keys in their security devices
such as IC cards installed in their receivers and use their
secret keys to decrypt the encrypted content. Current digital
broadcasting systems often use an IC card as a tamper resistant
module (TRM). The secret key is stored in the IC card and
users are able to receive its service only at home, because
they can neither extract their secret keys from their TRMs nor
copy them. If it were possible to copy their secret keys, users
would be able to obtain a service outside their homes. While
it is very beneficial for users, there would be a problem for
CPs. If a user were to lose his/her copied secret keys, the CPs
would be exposed to serious damage.
To reduce such a thread, the system could be developed
that enables users to take their secret keys with them in order
to get content distribution services outside and while at the
same time minimizing the damage of key exposure. One way
to realize it would be to set a valid period for each secret key
- that is, to give secret keys a temporal property. CPs allow
users to copy only temporary secret keys and to bring them
out. Even if the temporary secret keys were to be lost, the
potential damage would be only during their valid periods.
The secure traitor tracing scheme against key exposure
(TTaKE), that we propose, is designed for such a content
distribution service. The system meets the requirements of
both CPs and users and is compatible with the current form
of broadcasting.
Our Contribution: We first define a TTaKE and then con-
struct a TTaKE that is semantically secure against chosen
plaintext attacks under the assumption of the Decision Diffie-
Hellman problem (DDHP). This scheme combines the proper-
ties of a TT and a forward secure public key cryptosystem. It
enables identifying users from their secret keys and tracing at
least one of the traitors who collude to make illegal decoders.
Moreover, each user’s secret key is updated periodically. This
updating sets valid periods for users’ secret keys and enables
damage resulting from key exposure to be minimized.
We compare TTaKE with a well-known TT scheme [8],
[9]. We have confirmed that the data size of our scheme is
the same as that of TT and that it fits in well with the current
broadcasting system using TRMs, provides usability outside
the home, and also protects CPs from key exposure.
II. DEFINITION
A. Model
A secure traitor tracing scheme against key exposure
(TTaKE) is a public key system in which there is a unique
encryption key and multiple decryption keys. The decryption
keys are updated using the master key (MK).
A CP first sets the period during which the service will
continue, and this period is divided into T small periods.
Then, it registers one public key, which will not be changed,
and distributes different MKs and initial secret keys (IKs) to
users. These MKs are stored in each user’s physically secure
device (SD). The user secret key, SKu,t, for a time period t is
updated periodically. The user can receive the service at any
time and in any location by using SKu,t stored in a portable
memory device (PM), which he/she can carry. The content is
encrypted using t and distributed. To update SKu,t, a partial
secret key, SK ′u,t, is first made and then SKu,t is calculated
using SKu,t−1 and SK
′
u,t.
In this scheme, if authorized users collude to make a PD
and the number of colluders is less than k, more than one of
them should be traceable. Furthermore, even if m secret keys
of the T periods have been exposed, there is no exposure of
the other keys’ information.
We describe this model formally as follows.
Definition 1: A TTaKE consists of following six polynomial
time algorithms (Gen,Upd*,Upd,Enc,Dec,TT).
Gen: Public key and user secret key generation algorithm.
This is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security
parameter, s, the total number of users, N , the maximum
number of colluding users, k, the total number of time periods,
T , the maximum number of times of key exposure per user,
m, the maximum number of times of key exposure per period,
kT , and the maximum total number of key exposures, mT . It
returns a public key, PK , user master keys, SK∗1 , · · · , SK∗N ,
user initial keys, SK1,0, · · · , SKN,0, and secret information to
trace users, f .
Upd*: Device key updating algorithm. This is a deterministic
algorithm which takes as input time period index, t (1 ≤ t ≤
T ), and SK∗u. It returns a user partial secret key, SK
′
u,t.
Upd: User key updating algorithm. This is a deterministic
algorithm which takes as input t, SK ′u,t, and SKu,t−1. It
returns SKu,t.
Enc: Encryption algorithm. This is a probabilistic algorithm
which takes as input PK , t, and a message, M . It returns a
ciphertext, C :=< t,Head >.
Dec: Decryption algorithm. This is a deterministic algorithm
which takes as input SKu,t and C. It returns M , or a special
symbol, ⊥. We require the following for all messages:
Dec(SKu,t,(Enc(t, PK,M)) = M
TT: User tracing algorithm. This is a deterministic algorithm
which takes as input PK , f , and {SKpi,t}. It returns one of
the suspected traitors’ IDs, p ∈ {pi}.
Black box traitor tracing is not considered in this paper, but
we will study it in the future.
Next, we define a pirate decoder, PD, which decrypts
encrypted content for all periods correctly. We do not consider
a temporary pirate decoder, which is not very useful for users.
We describe PD as follows.
PD: Pirate decoder. This must correctly decrypt a valid cipher-
text generated by Enc for all service periods.
B. Security
Here, we address the security definition of a TTaKE. A
TTaKE is considered secure if for a confiscated pirate decoder,
one of the traitors can be identified or it cannot decrypt any
ciphertext at a target time period t which is chosen by an
adversary. More precisely, it is required that
• for a given PD, TT of the TTaKE can detect one of the
authorized users’ IDs who collude to make a PD.
• without any PDs, any adversary cannot obtain any in-
formation on the distributed content for the target time
period, t.
We describe three kinds of security as follows.
Definition 2: Let Π=(Gen,Upd*,Upd,Enc,Dec,TT) be a
TTaKE. When less than k users (traitors) extract their MKs
and collude to make a PD, if the scheme can trace at least
one of the traitors, then Π is (k,N)-traceable.
Next, we define (m,T, kT ,mT )-indistinguishability, which
addresses semantic security against an adversary who can
(non-adaptively) obtains exposed secret keys from honest
users. Similar to the standard definition of semantic security,
for a given public key, PK , an adversary chooses a time
period, t∗, and a pair of messages with the same length, M0
and M1, and submits them to a left-or-right encryption oracle,
which returns a challenge ciphertext c∗ := Enc(t∗, PK,Mb)
for b ∈R {0, 1}. A TTaKE is considered semantically secure if
any probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine can answer
the correct value of b with probability of at most 1/2+a
negligible value. In our definition, (randomly chosen) exposed
keys, EXPKEY∗, from legitimate users are also given to the
adversary, and he may use these keys for the attack with a
restriction that t∗ may not be identical to a valid time period
of any exposed key. See also Def. 1 for other restrictions for
the number of exposed keys with respect to m, kT and mT .
Definition 3: Let Π = (Gen,Upd∗,Upd,Enc,Dec,TT) be a
TTaKE. Let A = (Afind, Aguess) be an adversary. Define the
success probability of guessing the value of b as follows:
SuccA,Π(s, k,N,m, T, kT ,mT )
def
= Pr[
(PK,SK∗1 , · · · , SK
∗
N , SK1,0, · · · , SKN,0, f)
← Gen(1s, k,N,m, T, kT ,mT );
EXPKEY∗ ∈R {EXPKEY|
EXPKEY ⊂ {SKu,t}1≤u≤N, 1≤t≤T ,
|EXPKEY| ≤ mT ,
|EXPKEY ∩ {SKu,t}1≤u≤N, t=t′ | ≤ kT
∀t′ ∈ {1, · · · , T },
|EXPKEY ∩ {SKu,t}u=u′, 1≤t≤T | ≤ m
∀u′ ∈ {1, · · · , N}};
(t∗,M0,M1, σ)← Afind(PK, EXPKEY
∗);
b ∈R {0, 1}; c
∗ ← Enc(t∗, PK,Mb);
b′ ← Aguess(PK, σ, c
∗) :
b′ = b]
where σ is side information obtained by Afind. Then
Π is (m,T, kT ,mT )-indistinguishable if for any adversary∣∣SuccA,Π(s, k,N,m, T, kT ,mT )− 12
∣∣ is negligible.
Definition 4: Let Π = (Gen,Upd∗,Upd,Enc,Dec,TT) be
a TTaKE. Π is (k,N,m, T, kT ,mT )-secure if it is (k,N)-
traceable and (m,T, kT ,mT )-indistinguishable.
Intuitively, (k,N,m, T, kT ,mT )-security implies that it is
impossible to produce a PD that can decrypt ciphertexts
at all time periods and simultaneously guarantee that no
colluder can be detected. When traitors make a PD, it is
meaningless to consider semantic security, so we consider
the traceability described in Definition 2. On the other hand,
when an adversary gets exposed secret keys, which are valid
during certain periods, the content of the other time periods
should be safe, so it is important to consider semantic security
in Definition 3. Hence, we consider that a TTaKE can trace
traitors, is semantically secure against accidental key exposure,
and totally has the (k,N,m, T, kT ,mT )-security described in
Definition 4.
III. (k,N,m, T, kT ,mT )-SECURE TRAITOR TRACING
SCHEME AGAINST KEY EXPOSURE
We demonstrate a (k,N,m, T, kT ,mT )-secure traitor trac-
ing scheme against key exposure ((k,N,m, T, kT ,mT )-
TTaKE), which is based on the corrected Kurosawa-Desmedt
traitor tracing scheme (KD) [9] and the (m,T )-key-insulated
public-key scheme (DKXY) [7]. We review these two schemes
below. After that we describe a (k,N,m, T, kT ,mT )-TTaKE
in Subsection III-C.
A. Corrected Kurosawa-Desmedt Traitor Tracing (KD) [9]
This scheme is a public key scheme that has multiple secret
keys for one public key.
Key Generation(1s, k,N): Let p and q be primes, where
q | p−1 and the size of |q| is s, and let Gq be a subgroup of Z∗p
of its order q. All calculations are executed on Zp. A CP selects
a generator, g ∈ Gq, then chooses a random polynomial,
f(x) :=
∑2k−1
i=0 aix
i
, where ai ∈ Zq (i = 0, · · · , 2k − 1),
publishes its public key, PK := (g, p, q, y0, y1, · · · , y2k−1),
where yi = gai , and sends a personal secret key, di := f(ui),
to each user, ui(i = 1, 2, · · · , N).
Encryption(PK,M): A CP selects a random number, r, and
produces Head := (y, z0, z1, · · · , z2k−1), where y = gr,z0 =
Myr0 and zi = yri (i = 1, · · · , 2k − 1), using PK and a
message, M . Then it sends Head to each user.
Decryption(Head, di): Each user, ui, computes M from
Head using di as follows:
M =
z0
∏2k−1
j=1
(zj)
u
j
i
ydi
In [9], it is shown that this scheme can trace at least one
traitor out of k traitors and that the scheme is secure against
linear attacks of k colluders [10]. Moreover, the scheme in [9]
includes a scheme for black box traitor tracing.
B. (m,T )-Key-Insulated Public-Key Scheme (DKXY)[7]
This scheme is a secure public key scheme against key
exposure that can tolerate m times key exposure. It uses
two generators to achieve security against adaptive attacks.
Below, for simplicity, we show its construction with only one
generator. It is secure against non-adaptive attacks.
Key Generation(1s,m, T ): Let p and q be primes, where
q | p − 1 and the size of |q| is s, and let Gq be a subgroup
of Z∗p of its order q. All calculations are executed on Zp.
A user selects a generator, g ∈ Gq. He chooses a random
number, a∗i ∈ Zq , and calculates y∗i = ga
∗
i (i = 0, · · · ,m). He
then makes a public key, PK := (g, p, q, y∗0 , · · · , y∗m), a MK,
SK∗ := (a∗1, · · · , a
∗
m), and an IK, SK0 := a∗0. He publishes
PK , stores SK0 in a PM and SK∗ in his SD.
Device Key Update(t, SK∗): The SD calculates a partial key,
SK
′
t :=
∑m
j=1 a
∗
j (t
j − (t− 1)j), using SK∗, and then sends
SK
′
t to the user.
User Key Update(t, SK ′t , SKt−1): The user calculates
SKt := SK
′
t + SKt−1, using SK
′
t sent by SD and SKt−1,
and stores SKt.
Encryption(t, PK,M): A CP chooses a random number, α ∈
Zq , then calculates yt :=
∏m
j=0(y
∗
j )
tj
, encrypts a message, M ,
produces a ciphertext, C := (gα, yαt M), combines it with the
time period t and sends (t, C) to the user.
Decryption(C, SKt): The user decrypts C := (y, zt), using
SKt. He then gets M , through the following calculation:
M = zt
ySKt
C. (k,N,m, T, 2k − 1, 2k(m+ 1)− 1)-TTaKE
A (k,N,m, T, 2k − 1, 2k(m + 1) − 1)-TTaKE combines
properties of both KD and DKXY. We propose a way to
construct a (k,N,m, T, 2k − 1, 2k(m + 1) − 1)-TTaKE.
It also employs only one generator and is secure against
non-adaptive attacks.
Gen(1s, k,N,m, T, 2k − 1, 2k(m + 1) − 1): Let p and
q be primes such that q | p − 1 where the size of
|q| is s and let Gq be a subgroup of Z∗p of order q.
All calculations are executed on Zp. The CP selects a
generator, g ∈ Gq, and random numbers, ai,j ∈ Zq
(i = 0, 1, · · · , 2k − 1; j = 0, 1, · · · ,m), makes a two-variable
polynomial, f(u, t) :=
∑2k−1
i=0
∑m
j=0 ai,ju
itj , and publishes
its public key, PK := (g, p, q, ga0,0 , ga0,1 , · · · , ga2k−1,m).
Then it makes each user’s MK, SK∗u :=
(
∑2k−1
i=0 ai,1u
i,
∑2k−1
i=0 ai,2u
i, · · · ,
∑2k−1
i=0 ai,mu
i), and
IK, SKu,0 :=
∑2k−1
i=0 ai,0u
i (u = 1, 2, · · · , N ), and sends
them to each user. The users store SKu,0 in their PMs and
store SK∗u in their SDs.
Upd*(t, SK∗u): The SD calculates a partial key,
SK
′
t :=
∑m
j=1 z
∗
j (t
j − (t − 1)j), where z∗j :=
∑2k−1
i=0 ai,ju
i
,
using t and SK∗u and then sends SK
′
t to the user.
Upd(t, SK ′u,t, SKu,t−1): The user calculates his/her secret
key, SKu,t = SK
′
u,t + SKu,t−1 using SK
′
u,t sent by his/her
SD and SKu,t−1, and stores it.
Enc(t, PK,M): The CP chooses a random number, α ∈ Zq ,
and produces Head(t) := (y, zt,0, zt,1, · · · , zt,2k−1),
where y = gα,zt,0 = M(
∏m
j=0((g
a0,j )t
j
)α and
zt,i = (
∏m
j=0((g
ai,j )t
j
)α(i = 1, · · · , 2k − 1), using
PK , a message, M , and t. Then Head(t) is combined with
t and a ciphertext, C :=< t,Head(t) >, is created.
Dec(C, SKu,t): The user decrypts C, using SKu,t. He then
obtains M , through the following calculation:
M =
zt,0
∏2k−1
j=1
(zt,j)
uj
ySKu,t
TT(PK, f(u, t), SKp,t): When a PD is found, a secret key,
SKp,t is checked and one of traitors, p, is identified. We
describe this tracing algorithm in Subsection IV-A.
We emphasize that it is crucial to update SKp,t in each time
period, to prevent an adversary from re-using the same secret
keys in different time periods.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Tracing Traitors
When k traitors collude to make a PD, they don’t want to
be identified, so they may try to make a PD that includes a
different user’s identification and secret key. However, creating
them is as complex as the discrete logarithm problem (DLP),
so the identification and the secret key included in the PD
must be those of one of the colluding members. By detecting
the identification, one of the traitors can be traced. As a result,
it is (k,N)-traceable described in Definition 2.
Theorem 1: The proposed scheme is a (k,N)-traceable
scheme as described in Definition 2 assuming the difficulty
of the DLP on Gq.
Proof: When a PD is confiscated, the user identification
and secret key (u1, f(u1, t1)), · · · , (uT , f(uT , tT )) contained
in it are exposed, or the user identification and MK and IK,
(u, SK∗u, SKu,0) contained in it are exposed. In the former
case, our scheme can trace one of k traitors with a secret key
(utp , f(utp , tp) of one time period tp. In the latter case, the
IK is regarded as a secret key of time 0 and the same traitor
tracing algorithm is used.
Formally, we can show that an adversary who can make
a PD, which includes the identification and a secret key for
a time period t of a user who is not one of the k traitors,
can solve the DLP with non-negligible probability. To solve
the DLP (g, p, y = gr), we perform the following steps S1
through S8.
S1. Choose random numbers d1, · · · , dk ∈ Gq.
S2. Set the matrix UP for up1, · · · , upk as
UP =


up1 u
2
p1 · · · u
k
p1
up2 u
2
p2 · · · u
k
p2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
upk u
2
pk · · · u
k
pk


Here, UP has an inverse matrix UP−1, because it is a
Vandermonde matrix.
S3. Let (upj,1, · · · , upj,k) be the j’th row of matrix UP−1
and calculate b′j = upj,1d1 + upj,2d2 + · · ·+ upj,kdk.
S4. Set gaj,0 = g
b
′
j
y
upj,1+upj,2+···+upj,k
and gaj,i = 1, (i =
1, · · · ,m).
S5. Set the public key as PK :=
(g, p, q, y,
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, · · · , 1, ga1,0 ,
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, · · · , 1, · · · , gak,0 ,
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, · · · , 1, 1, · · · , 1)
and the traitors’ secret keys (upi, SKpi,t)(i = 1, · · · , k) as
SKpi,t = di
S6. Send PK and the traitors’ secret keys of time period t to
the adversary.
S7. The adversary returns a new identification and its secret
key of time period t, (up, dp).
S8. Calculate the coefficients of ft(x) =
∑2k−1
i=0 bix
i
, where
bi = 0(2k − 1 ≥ i ≥ k + 1), di = ft(upi)(i = 1, · · · , k) and
dp = ft(up). Also ai,0 = bi, (i = 0, · · · , k). Among these
coefficients, a0,0 becomes the solution to the given DLP.
This result contradicts the difficulty of the DLP. Hence,
there is no such algorithm which can make a new identification
and its secret key.
We now show that our scheme’s traceability is reduced
to that of KD and that our scheme is secure against linear
attacks of k colluders [10]. User u’s secret key in time period
t is as follows: SKu =
∑2k−1
i=0
∑m
j=0 ai,ju
itj . In another
expression, SKu =
∑2k−1
i=0 biu
i
, where bi =
∑m
j=0 ai,jt
j
.
These coefficients, bi(i = 0, · · · , 2k − 1), do not depend on
u. Hence, the polynomial’s degree on u to calculate SKu is
2k− 1. In KD, SKu is calculated as the polynomial, SKu =∑2k−1
i=0 aiu
i
. This structure is the same as that of our scheme
(SKu =
∑2k−1
i=0 biu
i), hence, our scheme’s traceability can
be reduced to that of KD. Moreover, KD’s security against
a linear attack is proven if this polynomial’s degree on u is
greater than 2k− 1 [11], [9]. The degree on u of our scheme
is also 2k−1. As a result our scheme is secure against a linear
attack.
Furthermore, a black box tracing scheme is described in [9].
We suppose that a similar black box tracing scheme could be
applied to our scheme, and we will try to do so in the future.
B. Chosen-Plaintext Security Based on DDHP
In the above, we showed that our scheme is a (k,N)-
traceable one. Here, we show a proof of (m,T, 2k−1, 2k(m+
1)− 1)-indistinguishability for our scheme and that overall, it
is a (k,N,m, T, kT , 2k(m+1)−1)-secure TTaKE as described
in Definition 4. First we show that the scheme is semantically
secure against a passive adversary, assuming the difficulty
of the DDHP on Gq. The assumption is that no polynomial
time algorithm can distinguish with non-negligible advantage
between the two distributions D =< g1, g2, ga1 , ga2 > and
R =< g1, g2, g
a
1 , g
b
2 >, where g1 and g2 are generators chosen
at random in Gq, and a and b are chosen at random in Zq .
Theorem 2: The proposed scheme is an (m,T, 2k ∗ (m +
1)− 1)-indistinguishable scheme as described in Definition 3
assuming the difficulty of the DDHP on Gq .
Proof: Assuming that there exists a probabilistic polynomial
time adversary A which can break our scheme, we show that
it is possible to construct another adversary B which can solve
TABLE I
SCHEME COMPARISON
KD Our Scheme
Data Header 2k + 1 2k + 1
size Public Key 2k + 3 2k ∗ (m + 1) + 3
User store 1 m+ 1
CPU Key Updating Mul 0 m2
cost Encryption Exp 2k + 1 2k ∗ (m + 1) + 1
Decryption Exp 2k 2k
the DDHP with a non-negligible advantage.
For an input (g1, g2, h1, h2), B solves the DDHP as follows.
First, B chooses 2k(m+1)−1 exposed keys according to the
restrictions in Definitions 1 and 3, and also set the values of
these keys uniformly at random from Zq . Let EXPKEY∗ be
the set of these exposed keys.
B also sets a0,0 = logg1 g2, and by Lagrange
interpolation, calculates a public key PK =
(g1, p, q, g
a0,0
1 , g
a0,1
1 , · · · , g
a2k−1,m
1 ) such that f(u, t) :=∑2k−1
i=0
∑m
j=0 ai,ju
itj passes through all points in EXPKEY∗
and ga0,01 = g2. Notice that this calculation can be performed
without knowing a0,0 = logg1 g2 and there exists at least one
f(u, t) which satisfies the above requirement.
Next, B gives PK to A, and A submits a query
(t∗,M0,M1) to the left-or-right encryption oracle. On re-
ceiving this, B sets a′0,0 = logh1 h2, and by Lagrange
interpolation, calculates (ha
′
0,0
1 , h
a′0,1
1 , · · · , h
a′2k−1,m
1 ) such that
f ′(u, t) :=
∑2k−1
i=0
∑m
j=0 a
′
i,ju
itj passes through all points in
EXPKEY∗ and ha
′
0,0
1 = h2. Note that f ′(u, t) = f(u, t) if
logg1 g2 = logh1 h2. B then picks b ∈R {0, 1} and returns
a challenge ciphertext c∗ := (y∗, zt∗,0, zt∗,1, · · · , zt∗,2k−1)
such that y∗ = h1, zt∗,0 = Mb
∏m
j=0(h
a′0,j
1 )
tj
, zt∗,i =∏m
j=0(h
a′i,j
1 )
tj (i = 1, · · · , 2k − 1).
It is clear that if (g1, g2, h1, h2) is a DDH-tuple, then c∗ is
a valid ciphertext of Mb. On the other hand, if it is a random
tuple, it is information theoretically impossible to obtain any
information on b, due to the randomness of “logh1 h2”. Letting
b′ be A’s output, B outputs D if b′ = b, otherwise, B outputs
R. Consequently, B solves the DDHP with a non-negligible
advantage.
V. COMPARISON
We compare our scheme (TTaKE) with KD with respect
to data size and computational cost (CPU cost). The results
are shown in Table I. The CPU cost results show only their
dominant values. ’Mul’ denotes those of multiplication, and
’Exp’ denotes those of exponential calculation.
The header size in TTaKE is the same as that in KD.
However, the public key size of TTaKE is larger than that
of KD. The user stored data size of TTaKE is also larger
than that of KD. When we consider the security against key
exposure during T service periods, KD needs to update its
public key and its user stored data at the beginning of each
period. Through this updating process, the total size of public
keys and user data are T ∗ (2k+3) and T , respectively. As T
exceeds m, these sizes are greater than those of TTaKE.
In terms of CPU cost, TTaKE needs to update the user
secret key, but this is unnecessary with KD. The CPU cost of
encryption with TTaKE exceeds that of KD. The CPU cost
of decryption with TTaKE is the same as that of KD. When
we also consider the security against key exposure during T
service periods, a CP needs to generate all the user’s secret
keys. This generation needs T ∗N ∗ (2k − 1) ∗ (k + 1) times
multiplication calculation. Furthermore, secret communication
is needed to send secret keys to each user.
Overall, our scheme is efficient in terms of user data size,
CPU cost and communication cost, when we consider security
against key exposure during T service periods. However, its
public key size and the CPU cost of encryption rises with
k,m, so these should be reduced. Moreover, a black box traitor
tracing scheme should be studied in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a secure traitor tracing scheme against
key exposure ((k,N,m, T, kT ,mT )-TTaKE). Our scheme is
based on KD [9] and DKXY [7] and it uses of a polynomial
with two variables (user ID and time). Its traceability is based
on the difficulty of solving the DLP. Semantic security of the
encryption scheme against a passive adversary was achieved
based on the DDHP.
To conclude, we mention an application of our system to
protect copyrighted works against piracy. CPs need an effective
TT. Furthermore, in the ”anytime and anywhere TV” [12]
being considered, users will need to carry their secret keys
for self-identification, which places secret keys at risk of
exposure. Potential damage due to secret key exposure should
be minimized.
Using our scheme, traitors can be traced and the damage
from secret key exposure can be minimized.
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